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The appellant's private psychiatrist warned
Hartford that she had attempted suicide
previously and that having to submit to a
second exam might cause further psychological stress. Four days after the required
psychiatric exam, the appellant attempted
suicide. She then brought suit alleging
that Hartford "intended to inflict emotional distress in order to cause her to drop
the claim or commit suicide." Young, 303
Md. at 189. There was no claim in this suit
of medical malpractice, and in fact, the examining physician found that her emotional trauma was real and compensable.
The court of appeals ruled that this allegation of intentional infliction of emotional
distress satisfied the criteria of Art. 101
§ 44 and allowed her to bring a common
law action against Hartford.
Sterry is the third in a series of recent
cases which demonstrate the Maryland
courts' willingness to limit the scope of the
exclusivity clause. In Young v. Hartford,
supra, and a similar case decided the same
day, Gallagher v. Bituminous Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 303 Md. 201 492 A.2d
1280 (1985), the court held that a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress
by the employer is not precluded from a
civil tort action. Several months later, in
Sterry, the court allowed the plaintiff to
evade the "universally held" doctrine that
medical malpractice in a workmen's compensation case is exclusively compensable
under the Act. By permitting a semantic
manipulation alleging intentional medical
malpractice, the court appears to provide
another manner of egress from the confines of the exclusivity clause.

owned by Martin-Marietta. Liscombe filed
suit against Potomac Edison and Hagerstown Block for compensatory and punitive
damages for his injuries allegedly sustained
because of the defendants' gross negligence. Motions for summary judgment
were filed by Potomac Edison and Hagerstown Block on the ground that Liscombe
was contributorily negligent as a matter of
law. The circuit court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, and
Liscombe appealed to the court of special
appeals. The court of appeals granted certiorari before any consideration by the
intermediate appellate court.
On appeal Liscombe alleged that the
trial court erred in finding contributory
negligence as a matter of law, and in the
alternative that contributory negligence is
not a defense where the tort is alleged to be
based on wanton or reckless conduct. Liscombe also contended that the trial court
erred in refusing to permit the issue oflast
clear chance to go to the jury.
Liscombe claimed that there were three
areas of disputed facts which compel the
issue of contributory negligence to be determined by the trier offact. First, whether
he had knowledge of a similar accident
which occurred one month prior to his injury. Second, whether his truck actually
touched the wires or whether the electrical
shock was caused by an arcing effect without contact. Third, whether the sunlight
affected his ability to see the wires at the
time of the accident. The court dismissed
these contentions as immaterial, and found
that Liscombe knew of the presence and

inherent danger presented by the wires
and that this was enough to establish his
negligence.
The court relied on its decision in State
v. Potomac Edison Company, 166 Md.
138, 170 A. 568 (1934), in deciding that
the undisputed facts were sufficient to find
Liscombe guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. In this case the
court held that "[i]f [the injured person]
knew or should have known that the wire
was dangerous, it follows as of course that
he was negligent in touching it, or in coming near enough to it to receive the shock."
Id., at 147,170 A. at 571. The court went
on to identify three elements, as stated in
Stancill v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 744
F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which must be
established before the plaintiff can be
deemed negligent because he assumed the
risk. The plaintiff must have "(1) had
knowledge of the risk of danger, (2) appreciated that risk and (3) voluntarily exposed
himself to it." /d. at 866.
While the court in Stancill spoke in
terms of assumption of risk, in the case at
bar the court held these elements also
prove negligence in cases involving electrical accidents. The court went on to state
that in Maryland, electrical accident cases
have historically fallen under the contributory negligence theory rather than assumption of risk.
After determining that the plaintiff voluntarily exposed himself to the admittedly
dangerous wires and thus his own negligence contributed to his injury, the court
addressed whether the defendants were

-Malinda S. Siegel

Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co.:
CONTRmUTORY NEGLIGENCESTILL A COMPLETE BAR TO
RECOVERY
In Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co.,
303 Md. 619, 495 A.2d 838 (1985), the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that a
dump truck operator who was aware of
overhead powerlines, but nevertheless was
electrically shocked when his truck came
in close proximity to the lines, was guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of
law. In so holding, the court affirmed the
lower court's decision to grant the defendants' motions for summary judgment.
In Liscombe the plaintiff, Robert D.
Liscombe, received a severe electric shock
when he raised the bed of his tractor-trailer
dump truck into overhead electric lines belonging to the defendant, Potomac Edison. The injury occurred while Liscombe
was delivering a load of sand to the codefendant, Hagerstown Block, on property
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grossly negligent. The court held that
once it was established that Liscombe was
contributorily negligent as a matter oflaw
it was up to Liscombe to prove gross negligence on the part of the defendants. Evidence at trial showed that the defendants
were aware of the dangerous position of
the overhead lines, because one month before a similar, less serious, accident occurred. However, the court found that
Potomac and Hagerstown acted reasonably
in trying to prevent further accidents. The
evidence showed red flags had been hung
from the wires, oral warnings were given
to all trucks entering the plant, and Potomac had staked out a new route for the
wires. After an examination of the facts,
the court found the defendants acted reasonably under the situation and were not
guilty of gross negligence.
The court dismissed Liscombe's last argument, that the issue oflast clear chance
should have been left for the jury, by holding the doctrine inapplicable in this case.
The court, citing Sanner v. Suard, 236
Md. 271, 203 A.2d 885 (1964), held that
in Maryland the last clear chance doctrine
has no application when the negligence of
the plaintiff is concurrent with the negligence of the defendant, and the defendant
had no opportunity to avoid the accident
after the original negligence. In the case at
bar no such opportunity was afforded to
the defendants.
The court of appeals' decision in Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co. reaffirms the
Maryland judiciary's position that a plaintiff guilty of negligence, however slight, is
completely barred from recovery. The
burden placed upon the defendant in electrical shock cases is slight. In the absence
of wanton or reckless conduct on the part
of the defendant, a person who knew or
should have known that a wire is dangerous, and puts himself close enough to it to
receive a shock, is contributorily negligent
as a matter of law and is thus barred from
recovery.

-Stephen Markey

American Federation of State,
County, and Munidpal Employees v.
State of Washington: NINTH
CIRCUIT REJECTS COMPARABLE
WORTH
In American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees v. State of Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985), the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the state's decision
to base compensation on the competitive
market rather than on a theory of comparable worth did not establish its liability
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under a disparate impact analysis. The
court held that the state's participation in
the market system did not allow the inference of discriminatory motive so as to establish its liability under a disparate treatment theory, since the state did not create
the market disparity and was not shown to
have been motivated by impermissible sexbased considerations in setting salaries.
The State of Washington was sued in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington by two unions:
the American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees, (AFSCME), and
the Washington Federation of State Employees, (WFSE), on behalf of a class of
15,500 state employees who work or have

wage disparity of about twenty percent to
the disadvantage of employees in jobs held
predominately by women for jobs of comparable worth held predominately by men.
Comparable worth was determined by a
four-prong test: knowledge and skills, mental demands, accountability, and working
conditions. Similar surveys were conducted in 1976 and 1980. In 1983, the
state adopted a ten-year plan to correct the
disparity.
The district court ordered immediate
implementation of a system of compensation based on comparable worth as well as
back pay. The district court based its determination of sex discrimination on two
theories: disparate impact and dispa~ate

worked in jobs consisting of at least seventy
percent female employees. The district
court found that the state discriminated on
the basis of sex by compensating employees
in predominately female jobs at lower rates
than employees in predominately male
jobs, where the jobs were found to be although dissimilar, of comparable worth to
the employer. The district court found
Washington State in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c.
§ 200e-2(a) (1982).
The State of Washington sets its employee salaries at rates comparable to the
prevailing market rates in the public and
private sectors. Market rates are determined by a process of surveys, hearings,
and state budget analyses. In 1974, the
state conducted a wage disparity study entitled "The Willis Study" which found a

treatment. Disparate impact discrimination involves a facially neutral employment practice that, without business justification, has a disproportionately adverse
impact upon members of a group protected
under Title VII. Proof of intent is not required, because, where a practice is specific and focused, the question is whether
the employer's explanation for the compensation policy reveals that it is a pretext
for discrimination. For disparate treatment analysis, discriminatory intent is an
essential element. Under the disparate
treatment theory, to establish intent, it is
insufficient for the plaintiff to show that
the employer was merely aware of the adverse consequences of a compensation policy. The plaintiff must show that the employer chose the policy, at least partly,
because of its adverse effects.

